Gulf monarchies 'afraid' of Trump: Was the perception of security in wealthy states like Dubai and Qatar just a mirage?

 Gulf monarchies 'afraid' of Trump: Was the perception of security in wealthy states like Dubai and Qatar just a mirage?

 

In recent decades, there have been frequent reports of bombings in Lebanon, suicide bombings in crowded markets in Iraq and the kidnapping or killing of foreign nationals by the so-called Islamic State in Syria, but Dubai has always been a party haven.

The world’s richest people have bought bungalows on the beaches of Dubai, enjoyed the museums of Abu Dhabi and enjoyed desert safaris in the Qatari desert.

In a Middle East rocked by wars, protests and instability, countries like the United Arab Emirates and Qatar have for years presented themselves as oases of peace and prosperity.

Their advantageous tax policies have attracted billions of dollars in foreign investment and transformed areas like Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Doha into major destinations for the world’s billionaires and luxury tourism, as well as international events and conferences.

However, this dream was shattered on February 28 when Iran launched attacks on Israeli cities and American bases in the Middle East in response to joint US-Israeli air strikes on Tehran.

The Gulf monarchies suddenly found themselves embroiled in a conflict they never wanted.

“These Gulf states even tried to persuade President Trump not to take action against Iran,” says Anna Jacob Khalaf, a fellow at the European Peace Institute. But the Arab rulers’ efforts were in vain.

Was it just a mirage?

Bader al-Saif, a former deputy chief of staff to the Kuwaiti prime minister, is now a professor at Kuwait University. “The Gulf states had established themselves as the safest places in the Middle East, but the events of the past few weeks have seriously tarnished that reputation,” he says.

It should be remembered that this part of the world has invested heavily in providing security and amenities.

The region’s royal but authoritarian governments have invested heavily in surveillance systems, which have largely protected them from terrorism, but they have also targeted dissent and anything that could tarnish their image.

For example, in the past three weeks, dozens of people, including foreigners, have been arrested in the Gulf states for posting videos of Iranian attacks.

In an effort to attract foreign workers, tourists and international investors, these conservative Muslim countries have also created an atmosphere of relaxation, but it has its limits: drinking alcohol is allowed in some places, but public displays of homosexuality are not.

Low or non-existent taxes have made these countries extremely popular in recent decades, and at the same time they have become a tourist attraction from around the world.

But the recent conflict seems to be putting all their hard work into vain.

Frustration and Anger

The US and Israel’s war with Iran has also made the Gulf countries targets for Iranian attacks. This war has created a sense of anger and frustration among the citizens and rulers of these Gulf states.

Khalifa Ahmed Al Habtoor, a billionaire businessman from the United Arab Emirates, was the first prominent figure to criticize President Trump for dragging the region into war.

In an open letter to President Trump, he said, “Who gave you the authority to drag our region into war with Iran? And on what did you base this dangerous decision?”

He questioned whether Trump “calculated the collateral damage before pulling the trigger?”

Elham Fakhro says that “the sense of betrayal that can be clearly felt in Gulf capitals is particularly deep.” However, this anger is unlikely to be openly expressed for some time.

The Gulf states have invested heavily in their relations with Washington, including hosting its military bases, providing logistical facilities, promising massive investment, and bearing the internal political cost of aligning themselves with a deeply unpopular US policy in the region.

Fakhro adds that “in return, these Gulf states at least expected to be consulted before a war that would ultimately target them.”

“But that has not happened.” “Iranian missiles hit their capitals, airports, oil facilities and financial centres not because they did anything themselves, but because of decisions made in Washington and Tel Aviv.”

Neil Quilliam, a researcher at London think tank Chatham House, agrees that there is “enormous anger” in Gulf capitals, but that “there is little they can do or are likely to express in a public forum.”

This is not the first time the US has sidelined them from a major issue.

When the nuclear deal with Iran was reached in 2015, the Gulf states, which had always demanded to be part of any deal with Tehran, were excluded.

Security Strategy

The Gulf monarchies and their Persian neighbors have had strained relations since the fall of Shah Reza Pahlavi.

Iran is not an Arab country and is overwhelmingly Shiite, while the Gulf states are mostly Sunni. Since the 1979 revolution, Iran has positioned itself as the region’s chief enemy of the United States, with which the Arab monarchies are allied.

Similarly, the Gulf states have based their security on this relationship with Washington, especially Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar.

Neil Quilliam says that “all these countries were somehow looking for a clause equivalent to NATO’s Article 5 (which states that if one member is attacked, the others come to its defense), in which the United States would be obligated to defend them.”

He was referring to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, when the United States and its allies liberated Kuwait from Iraq.

But when Tehran bombed Saudi oil facilities in 2019 or Israel killed Hamas leaders in a bomb attack in Doha, Qatar, in 2025, the United States remained a silent spectator.

The latest attacks have reinforced these countries’ sense that Washington will not come to their aid.

According to Elham Fakhro, the Gulf states had based their security on three interrelated assumptions: that the United States would act as the primary guarantor against external threats, that reducing tensions with Iran would reduce the risk of direct conflict, and that for some countries, establishing selective relations with Israel would bring strategic benefits.

She adds that this strategy was designed so that Gulf governments could maintain a balance between Washington, Tehran, and Tel Aviv and not have to adopt a policy of choosing one over the other.

However, the Iran-Iraq war exposed the limitations of this alliance.

Some of these countries may choose to diversify their military partnerships with states like Turkey or Pakistan. But in Neil Quilliam’s opinion, “it will take a long time for them to move away from the US because many of their agreements related to training, weapons or aviation will last for at least the next 20 years.”