Vision 2030: How did Mohammed bin Salman's incredible multi-billion dollar projects, described by critics as a 'green garden show', come to an end?

 

Vision 2030: How did Mohammed bin Salman's incredible multi-billion dollar projects, described by critics as a 'green garden show', come to an end?

 

Nearly a decade ago, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, also known as MBS, announced a new vision for his country that was nothing short of science fiction. This mega-project was called ‘Vision 2030’.

In fact, it was a series of projects that were to be technologically astonishing not only for Saudi Arabia but also for the world.

These concepts were translated into brilliant promotional materials and fictionalized scenarios related to these projects, which received extensive media coverage around the world, and contained elements of both amazement and ridicule.

 

All of these projects were to be built through Saudi Arabia’s nearly $1 trillion sovereign Public Investment Fund (PIF). The wealth of the Public Investment Fund, which was largely dependent on oil revenues, was to be used to lay the foundation for a future (Vision 2030) that was independent of oil.

Now, with just four years to go until 2030, these plans are likely to be pushed back. One reason is financial constraints, as the sharp drop in oil prices before the current Middle East war meant that Saudi Arabia’s extraordinary wealth was also affected.

Although the war has now boosted oil prices, the uncertainty created by the conflict will continue to weigh on Saudi revenues and spending. And foreign investment in these hugely expensive visionary projects has never materialised to the extent that Saudi officials had hoped.

So the question is: is this a reshuffling of priorities or a retreat?

From Vision to Reality

Some of the most prominent projects included in Vision 2030 are now being scaled back, halted, or even abandoned. Many of these projects were to be completed under the $500 billion ‘Neom Megacity’ project.

The winter resort project, Trogena, in the mountains of northwestern Saudi Arabia has also been curtailed. The region of Saudi Arabia receives snow in winter, defying the notion of Saudi Arabia as a desert, but the snow doesn’t last long.

The year-round mountain resort project created a fantasy that is no longer considered viable. It was to feature miles of ski slopes and a full-fledged ski village, complete with an artificial lake, luxury hotels and shops. A mini St. Moritz in the Arabian mountains.

And the project was to be ready in time to host the 2029 Asian Winter Games, but the plan has now been scrapped and the Winter Games will now be held in Kazakhstan.

The Cube was a project to build apartments and offices that would have housed 20 Empire State Building-style buildings. But the project has now been completely abandoned. It was expected to cost around $50 billion.

The Love Golf Tour has also been reexamined in recent weeks, and is being described as a costly and failed effort that has cost around $5 billion so far, but has done little to improve Saudi Arabia’s finances or its reputation in the international community.

Some observers who have followed Saudi Arabia for decades, including Alan R. Wald, author of Saudi Incorporated, say they have seen it all before.

“It’s the same old playbook, and it’s happening again with The Line. ‘We’re going to build this big project. "Oh, now we're going to limit it to a large extent." And this process has been repeated over and over again, and this pattern existed even before Mohammed bin Salman. They make big announcements, very prominently, and then either the plan doesn't happen at all or it's completed on a very limited scale or in a way that's very different from the original concept."

Trying to save Vision 2030

The big cuts in spending on some of the grandiose projects, which to the outside world appear to be an admission of at least partial failure, are being presented as positively as possible by Saudi officials.

“The idea now is to have small successes instead of these mega-projects,” says Abdullah.

“For example, the entertainment complex on Sandala Island in the Red Sea could be a small success that they could present, which is basically a very traditional resort, which could be presented as part of the vision, rather than projects like The Line and The Cube. And so they can say, ‘This represents the foundation of NEOM and we didn’t need the whole project.’”

This stance is consistent with what the authorities are now adopting. Yasser Al-Ramayen, governor of the Public Investment Fund, recently said that under a new five-year plan, the fund will focus on “improving its spending and disbursement performance through its strategy, while continuously reviewing the performance of its businesses to achieve balance and ensure the sustainability of its financial resources.”

For some analysts, the Saudi authorities’ renewed focus on these projects is a great way to save Vision 2030.

Prominent Saudi businessman and management consultant Thamer Shaker puts the situation differently. “What we are seeing is actually a natural evolution, where the focus is shifting from a purely ambition-based phase to an implementation-based phase. Every major national transformation reaches a point where prioritization, phased implementation and resource allocation become more important than the volume of announcements themselves.”

Major flagship projects, which are conceptually closer to reality, will continue to advance. These include the reconstruction and restoration of the ancient capital of Daraa in Riyadh and the state-of-the-art, sprawling theme park Six Flags Qadiya City near the Saudi capital.

The development of the ancient site of Al-Ula to the north, famous for its Nabataean monuments and rivaling Petra, is an example of how such projects can be completed

The changing landscape

The reassessment of Vision 2030 had already begun before the war between the US, Israel and Iran.

The conflict has worsened the current situation in the Gulf region and raised questions about the strategy that the UAE had pursued to become a global trade and tourism hub, and which Saudi Arabia had shown a clear desire not only to emulate but also to surpass.

Zalai says the Iran-Iran war has created further uncertainty about the future direction of Vision 2030.

“Before the war, the key sectors in which the Saudis wanted to invest more were artificial intelligence and other important projects such as tourism, manufacturing and mining, and some local industries. But all these sectors, except mining, have been severely affected by the war.”

“The main message before the war was that NEOM would now be reshaped as a center for industries focused on artificial intelligence. This makes sense in the context of war, of course, but it also shows that the underlying message is changing on a monthly basis. And it indicates strategic ambiguity. However, it is also a positive sign in the sense that Saudi officials know that they have to present a new plan.

Vision 2030 has helped to shape a different Saudi Arabia, which has been praised by some and criticized by others.

However, if there were three pillars of this transformation, there is still a long way to go.

Politically, dissent is still punished as harshly as before.

Socially, major changes have occurred, which have changed the overall feel of living in a city like Riyadh. This has led to increased spending by Saudi citizens on a wide range of leisure activities in the country that did not exist 20 years ago.

Economically, the mega-projects of Vision 2030 were intended to eventually lead the country to a future where private and foreign investment would match the kingdom’s vast oil wealth. However, this goal has only been partially achieved.

It has certainly been presented as a success story for the Saudi leadership, but not on the scale once imagined.

As much as Mohammed bin Salman may want to present himself as a visionary leader, it is clear that he and those around him are also willing to be pragmatic and realistic when necessary.