Saudi Arabia's non-aggression pact with Iran

 

Saudi Arabia's non-aggression pact with Iran

 

A few weeks ago, participants at the Delphi Economic Forum were asked to predict the outcome of the tense geopolitical situation that has developed in the Gulf and the wider Middle East since the outbreak of Operation Epic Fury in February.

They replied that the oracle, who once lived in this charming Greek city, would also have been hesitant to speak about the analysis of this particular war that has taken the world by surprise.

 Especially not directly about unexpected characters such as US President Donald Trump, what makes things even more complicated is the huge stream of contradictory news, confirmations and denials, as well as a large number of leaks, some of which are true while others are completely false and fabricated.

 But we forget that this is a war and in war, the first casualty is often the truth.

 

When it comes to the Saudi position, experts are advised to remember a few important things before reaching any decisive conclusions.

First, Saudi officials say what they mean and it must be done.

 Second, what is said in public is said privately and has nothing to do with the government. Third, sometimes, in critical times, silence is a strategic choice, especially when the rhetoric is loud and the many moving parts behind the scenes begin to emerge.

Thus, to understand the Saudi position, we need to go back to the original statements issued in the early days of the war.

 These included statements from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a cabinet meeting chaired by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman on March 10, which reaffirmed Saudi Arabia’s “necessary measures to protect its security, sovereignty and territorial integrity and deter aggression.”

 While some may have dismissed the policy stance, others accused Riyadh of being “very foolish” and argued that it was “even more foolish” to try to appease public opinion.

 The Saudi rulers decided that public safety was more important than public opinion, so it would be best to ignore such statements. Because in today’s militarized social media environment, “you get dirty when you fight pigs, while the pigs enjoy themselves.”

The underlying reality was that the main priority was to do whatever it took to protect the kingdom’s citizens and residents, while also extending a helping hand to its Gulf Cooperation Council neighbors and taking the necessary steps to prevent further war.

 The escalation could be prevented and not become an endless and dangerous regional war (unlike the US/Israel vs. Iran). Furthermore, during the war, there was a need to establish deterrence with Iran while at the same time keeping the door open for a negotiated solution, especially when it was seen that the military campaign was increasingly affecting the Gulf states and global energy supplies, which meant that it had the potential to become a global crisis.

Iran had already made it clear that, by severely targeting oil and gas facilities in the Gulf states and closing the Strait of Hormuz, its intention was to make the war as expensive as possible for the rest of the world.

 The Gulf states involved in the war would not have made a complete difference to the US and Israel, who already live with great power, but would have intensified the threat to the kingdom and civilian targets in the Gulf due to their oil facilities, since a global energy crisis would harm the US internally and in its war efforts, and would have had an impact on our region.

 In general On the other hand, the governments communicate with each other in different ways. As was the major decision to allow the Iranian ambassador to stay in Riyadh, so was the clear and full support for Pakistani mediation efforts, which are still ongoing.

The channels of communication remained open, with regular phone calls between Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan and his Iranian counterpart, Abbas Araqchi. Of course, Saudi Arabia has long been aware of the Iranian regime’s intentions and despite their sectarian opposition since 1979, they have remained on the same page. This is why, despite many threats, they have logically aligned themselves with each other and both believe that they will always be neighbors, and that any wrong move will have dire consequences.

 One strong argument for this is that if the United States had followed Saudi Arabia’s advice a decade ago when President Barack Obama was negotiating the JCPOA (Iran nuclear deal), his administration would have been able to avoid not only Iran’s nuclear enrichment, but also its proxy militias and its ballistic missiles.

 The current crisis could have been avoided if the program’s support had been resolved. Although it has not yet been confirmed by official Saudi sources, it has quietly retaliated against pro-Iranian militia targets in Iraq last week.

 But it has sought to prevent it as retaliation for an earlier Iranian attack on Saudi Arabia, which was a violation of the 2023 Beijing Declaration.